Brazil and India are two of the important emerging economies of today. A comparative study of the two country's economic regulations is interesting and can give useful learning for both countries. Their similarities in terms of large geographical area, large size of population, high unemployment rates, dominant services sector, a mixed economy framework, common interests in international markets and trade platforms like WTO (pharmaceuticals, agriculture, etc.) on the one hand and contrasts by way of political experiences, economic upheavals, dependence on foreign financial flows combine to make this a rich and meaningful study (Oliver Stuenkel, 2010) . The paper aims at identifying the reasons that have helped India to achieve rapid GDP growth and remain economically stable over the last quarter of a century and have also enabled Brazil, with a history of economic ups and downs to manage the effects of the 2008-09 crises quickly. The Brazilian economy posted positive economic conditions in barely a year, without resorting to large increases in government spending or monetary easing. This makes us think that the Brazilian economic regulations model has matured.
Introduction

Origin and Nature of the 2008 Global Crises
It is now well documented that since latter half of 2008 the world has faced one of the most severe financial and economic crisis since the Great Depression. The crisis may have begun as a sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US but subsequently it had spread to Europe and later to the rest of the world. (Bülent Gökay, Darrell Whitman , 2010) . It was manifested as a widespread banking crisis in the US and Europe, implying a collapse of both domestic and international financial markets, and then later became a global macroeconomic downturn. Countries like Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal to name a few are still struggling with slowdown, unemployment, deficits , debts and liquidity constraints that are being met with quantitative easing both from domestic and foreign support. (Grahame F. Thompson, 2010) . In spite of repeated injections through fiscal and monetary measures the outlook for these economies remains uncertain and pessimistic. In its World Economic Outlook, October 2008, the International Monetary Fund forecast global growth of 3.9 per cent in 2008 and of 3.0 per cent in 2009. These projections were subsequently revised downwards to 3.7 per cent for 2008, and 2.2 per cent for 2009( Global Economic Crises and its Impact on India, Rajya Sabha Secretariat,2009).Many economists consider this to be one of the worst global recessions since the 1970s and some also feel it to be comparable to the Great Depression of 1929. The effects of the recession are perhaps more serious and widespread as the world has become increasingly globalized. An integration and interaction of economies into a global economic arena has established multiple linkages and transmission channels across political borders that has possibly spread the recent crises from its place of origin in the USA to other superpowers in Europe or Asia like Japan. The spread of globalization also, led to the emergence of the concept of EMEs. Emerging market economies today are attractive destinations for trade and investment flows from the developed nations. Of these, the two democracies of Brazil and India are the largest EMEs and are holding much global interest as large potential markets. The two nations are also, noteworthy in the context of the current global recession as they have managed to easily and quickly weather the effects of the global crises without much burden on Government finances and without drastic structural changes in economic policies. This is important in a world where many Central banks are responding to the developments by aggressive and unconventional injection of liquidity, monetary easing and overall relaxation of collateral norms and eligibility criteria for their lending to financial institutions, along with supportive fiscal measures and governance directives.
This paper seeks to analyze the effects of the 2008 recession on the two EMEs of Brazil and India through a look at estimates for GDP growth, exports, FDI flows and foreign exchange reserves. Evaluation of existing state of the economies at the time of crises outbreak along with the then prevailing planned economic policies has been carried out to assess why the effects were less intense and less widespread in these countries compared to others . This meant that relatively not much upheaval occurred in the macro economy or in the policy formulation and implementation in these EMEs. We follow up the analysis with the safeguard measures that the two governments took to protect their economies from the crises triggered downfall, along with relating them to the context of the past and current needs of the economy.
Did the crises carry into EMEs like India and Brazil?
It is important to analyze the macro picture to assess the extent to which the crises affected Brazil and India in order to realize which macroeconomic targets were affected significantly and those which were not much shaken. This also, has to be done in context of the time frame that the negative changes lasted and thus, assess whether economic policy makers had a fresh and challenging role to play in resolving the crises related issues. The global financial crises emphasized the role and importance of USA as a pivot of global finance. It has been well recognized that regional financial crises, in the past, can occur without seriously impacting the national economies across the world. But when the US financial system stumbles, it brought down other major parts of the rest of the world. However, those who believe in decoupling hold that the European and Asian economies especially emerging ones, have broadened and deepened to the point that they no longer depend on the US for growth, leaving them insulated from a severe slow down there. They contend that it is possible for globalization and decoupling to coexist. Even, data suggest decoupling is no myth (World Economic Outlook, Update IMF, and January 2009). This is because in case of big emerging markets like Brazil and India have their own consumption and investment demands that are large and thus, their dependence on the US for providing demand is less. Further, the fact that Brazil exports 3 % and India exports 4 % of its GDP to US also, bears out the reduced dependence on American markets of these economies. The large own domestic markets of the EMEs like Brazil , India and of course, China can provide a degree of insulation from recession in US but the spread of globalization along with the depth and width of the present crises have resulted in a slowdown to a some extent in these countries as well.
The global financial and economic crises thus, did not leave Brazil and India entirely unscathed. This is borne out by the quarterly GDP growth rates for the two countries given in Tables 1 and 2 . However, what is noteworthy that the recovery was getting under way and could gather momentum by the end of 2009. While there was deceleration in the quarterly GDP growth rates for India during 2008 and 2009, Brazil did experience negative growth in 3 quarters. The severity of the decline in GDP growth was much less than for the OECD countries (taken by us to represent the developed nations) as per The impact on growth in exports was felt due to the widespread nature of the global crises in Brazil and India as well (Table 4 ). The year 2009 showed significant decline in export performance of both the countries (Table 5 ). The impact on all trade flows is illustrated for Brazil and India through Tables 6 and 7.The exports in visible goods showed larger declines that were partially offset by the import adjustment. As a result, the trade balances worsened but less than exports and were more so in the early part of the crises. Of course, the worsening in trade balances was more serious in case of India than Brazil. The worldwide recession and the country which is the global leader in Foreign Direct investment, USA, being worst hit meant that the adverse effects on FDI flows were bound to be noticeable. Both inward and outward FDI flows for the two countries declined in response to drying of liquidity, increased risks and curtailed market size. Brazil was more sensitive to changes in FDI flows (Table8) on both inward and outward account from 2008 to 2009 as compared to India (Percent change of volume of exports refers to the aggregate change in the quantities of total exports whose characteristics are unchanged. The goods and services and their prices are held constant, therefore changes are due to changes in quantities only). 
Effect on industry
The impact of deceleration of GDP growth was felt more intensely on the industry and manufacturing sectors in the two nations. The decline in industrial and manufacturing outputs was continuous in Brazil from October 2008 and continued at an average rate of decline of 7% next year as well. (Carmem Feijó, et al., 2009 ). The industry sector in Brazil was particularly affected as it was hit in three ways. First of all, exports of manufactured goods fell significantly during the last quarter of that year, by approximately 37%. The greatest problem that the Brazilian exporter faced was a sharp drop in sales to emerging countries. The decline in export demand globally did contribute to the poor performance especially as the nature of industrial products was technologically underdeveloped in Brazil. The performance for Indian industry was better though fluctuating and exhibits decline and recovery for the 12 months corresponding to the peak of the crises in the 2 countries (Tables 9 and 10). 
Foreign exchange Reserves
The estimates for foreign exchange reserve positions are more stable for both the countries. Some fall in reserves from October 2008 to May 2009 was observed, but due to cautious foreign exchange policies the reserve position did not deteriorate significantly. In Brazil this was possible with support from the depreciation of Real in 2008 and in India due to conscious policy and focus of Government on foreign exchange reserves. A repetition of the 1991foreign exchange crises should not happen is critical for the Indian economy and the fall in value of rupee further helped in export recovery. Also, India was an attractive destination for financial flows from the rest of the world due to financial and economic stability and orthodox economic policies of the government. 
Capital markets
The volatility in portfolio flows is always more than that in FDI flows so, the impact of global financial turmoil was felt particularly in the equity market in 2008. Indian stock prices have been severely affected by foreign institutional investors' (FIIs') withdrawals. FIIs had invested over Rs10, 00,000crore between January 2006 and January 2008, driving the Sensex to an all-time high of 20,000 over the period. But from January 2008 to January 2009, FIIs pulled out from the equity market partly as a flight to safety and partly to meet their redemption obligations at home. These withdrawals drove the Sensex (Stock market index) down from over 20,000 to less than 9,000 in a year. It seriously crippled the liquidity in the stock market (Ajay Chhibber, Thangavel Palanivel, 2009)Brazil's financial markets had undergone a transformation in recent years that had attracted investors. Changes in rules for publicly traded companies empowered small shareholders and improved corporate governance. Among the most important of these was Brazil's convergence with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Listed companies in Brazil report their consolidated financial statements under IFRS, as do Brazil's financial institutions. Also, a stable currency, fiscal balance and increased confidence set the stage for favorable developments in Brazil's capital markets. Growing activity in Brazil's equity index (BOVESPA) helped to re-ignite interest in buying emerging market assets through initial public offerings. The best performing stock market in 2009 was that of Brazil. The São Paolo-based BOVESPA Index BVSP surged 145 percent in dollar terms. (BOVESPA is the fourth largest stock exchange in the Americas in terms of market capitalization).
State of economy and policy stance before the crises
Political Backdrop
In India the current ruling Party was formed shortly after the 2004 elections, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA). It was a ruling coalition led by the Indian National Congress (INC) party, along with the Left Front, and has pursued policies targeting two different issues: inclusive growth and containing inflation. When the global crises hit, UPA-I was in its last year before the general elections of 2009. After the Left Front withdrew support because of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, UPA-I comfortably survived a trust vote in Parliament in August 2008, which gave it enhanced credibility. Overall, the public responded favorably to the government's management of the crises. The UPA was voted back into power in the general elections of 2009 with a slightly higher share of the vote than it had received in the previous election. However, this gain was possibly more a vindication of UPA's overall management of economic matters rather than a specific endorsement of the way in which it handled the economic crises specifically (Jayati Ghosh ,2009 ). The Politics of Brazil takes place in a framework of a federal republic, with a presidential representative of the democracy. The President of Brazil is both head of state and head of government, and of a multi-party system. Executive power is exercised by the government. Legislative power is vested in both the government and the two chambers of the National Congress.
A strong executive, led by a charismatic and very shrewd politician was in place in 2008. When it came to executive powers, the then president had exerted a clear, strong leadership. This also applied to his relationship with state governors, some of whom are members of parties in the opposition. Powerful, organized social groups, such as the syndicates, rallied behind him. Consequently, despite the inevitable criticism and opposition, in overall terms, there really was almost no policy controversy surrounding the crises response. (Renato G. Flôres Jr., Bertelsmann Stiftung ed., 2010). In political terms, the financial crises brought about another victory for President Lula da Silva. He successfully took Brazil through the uncertainties of a crisis that wreaked havoc in many developed economies of the world. He even participated in a collective loan to the IMF-something which Brazil has never done before. Indeed, the country emerged from the crises more confident about the model it adopted domestically and more assertive as a respected actor on the international stage. His power and clout can be judged by the fact that in 2010, President Lula's handpicked successor, Dilma Rousseff, was elected to be the first woman president of Brazil.
Economic Policy
The beginning of India's present period of growth dates to 1991, when the Indian government introduced a cycle of economic reforms, focusing on a model of liberalization, privatization and globalization. With the exception of industrial de-licensing, most of the initial reforms concerned the external sector. They included the elimination of quantitative restrictions (QRs) on exports and the rationalization and elimination of export subsidies, the latter of which were replaced by a system of export incentives. Further reforms included a reduction in import duties, moving away from an officially fixed rupee and allowing the market to determine the exchange rate, introducing a liberal policy on foreign institutional investments, and opening up the country to foreign direct investments (FDI). However, because of the federal nature of the constitution, reforms in the domestic economy are matters for the individual states and therefore, except for the financial sector most domestic reforms were slow. (Bibek Debroy, Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.), 2010). Before the crises, Brazil was faring well in macroeconomic terms, thanks to an unexpected continuity between the President Fernando Henrique Cardoso mandates (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) and the President Lula da Silva administrations (2003-2006, 2007 until 2010) , with the Banco Central do Brasil playing a major and strongly consistent role. High interest rates managed to keep inflation at bay, while an overvalued Real proved to affect the trade balance less than had been expected. (Philip Arestis, Fernando Ferrari-Filho, and Luiz Fernando de Paula, 2011) .Public debt was kept reasonably under control, and the treasury's performance suggested that the government's cash flow was being cautiously managed. Country had good foreign exchange reserves and for the first time was a net creditor in the foreign market (Renato G. Flôres Jr., Bertelsmann Stiftung ed.,2010).
In . Brazil's tax system was complex and conducive to predatory tax competition among the states and burdensome on labour. Overcoming these weaknesses is of utmost importance and it is proposed to unify state level VAT legislation across the country, to replace federal levies on enterprise turnover and payroll by a federal VAT and to alleviate the tax burden on labour income.
Reasons why effects of crises were less severe and curtailed within a year?
In India the high rates of gross domestic savings, 38 percent of GDP, and of gross capital formation 39.1 percent of GDP, enabled the economy to be in a strong self-financed growth position. This gave strength to the economy and was in contrast to spending bubbles created elsewhere. While foreign capital flows added to the investment and growth rates, sudden changes in these only led to increased volatility in the short run but the long run growth consequences were limited. The foreign reserves position was comfortable. A small Current account deficit of 1.5% of GDP was thus, manageable inspite of reduced foreign capital inflows.
India's primary macroeconomic imbalance was not external but related to domestic fiscal responsibility. In 2003, the government had passed a Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Bill (FRBM) and subsequently the individual states then passed similar legislation. This law mandated a fiscal deficit-to-GDP ratio of 3 percent in 2008-09. In fact, the fiscal deficit was 2.7 percent of GDP in 2007-08 but jumped to 6.2 percent in the following year. The deficit scenario becomes more serious when we include a gross fiscal deficit of 2.3 percent of GDP contributed by states in 2007-08 and further when financing through oil and fertilizer bonds is also treated as a fiscal deficit component. Thus, the fiscal stimulus introduced after September 2008 though not large, widened the deficits that were largely caused due to existing fiscal responsibilities.
Brazil felt the financial crises most strongly at the end of 2008 and the industry sector proved more sensitive to the problem. Inspite of this the economic situation began to improve in the second quarter of 2009. Macroeconomic consolidation along with a sound set of policies that focused on inflation targeting, a flexible exchange rate, prudent fiscal management, improved external liability position provided the ground for the Brazilian economy's resilience against the 2008 crises (Economic Survey of Brazil, OECD, 2009). Brazil's debt market was under exposed. Consumer debt was low and, in general, consumer liabilities were short term. Unlike the case of Europe and the US, the home mortgage debt was also, very low. In fact, property loans only accounted for 2.3% of the GDP in December 2008(José Roberto Mendonça de Barros, 2010). Financial innovations were limited. Resort to derivatives, and especially derivatives on derivatives, though practiced by the larger financial agents, was at least apparently modest.
During the Cardoso years, problems in the financial sector e.g. the banking crises in the 1990s were addressed by a comprehensive restructuring of the domestic banking system referred to as the PROER program. PROER helped the sector, but (correctly) set stricter controls and tough prudential rules, some with no match in developed economies. Public funds were used to avert the most serious bankruptcies and a solid, though more concentrated sector emerged (Renato G. Flôres Jr., Bertelsmann Stiftung ed.,2010) . This restructuring also affected other areas of finance, including those related to derivatives. Beyond the Banco Central do Brasil, a special chamber (or clearing-house) to manage and control over-the-counter operations related to all kinds of financial assets, Câmara de Custódia e Liquidação (CETIP) had been created in 1986. CETIP, for instance, had its powers revamped and made more effective during the crises period (Renato G. Flôres Jr., Bertelsmann Stiftung ed.,2010). The minimum leverage requirement of the Brazilian banks at the time was 11%, much higher than the 8% ratio usually recommended by the Basel agreements. However, even greater caution was actually applied, as a 16% capital/asset ratio was the effective position of the Brazilian banking system at the time. Thus, when the crises struck, the necessary institutions and measures were already in place. Enjoying this nearly optimal macroeconomic condition, Brazil only suffered from the crises via globalization-related channels, particularly the trade and financial ones, and not due to domestic inefficiencies in policies and measures.
Policy measures for Recovery
Growth of Personal Incomes was good in both Brazil and India even after the crises. The focus on inclusive growth by the governments of the two nations played a positive role in increasing incomes.
In the case of Brazil, the domestic market was fuelled by the comprehensive government-sponsored PAC public works program, a solid and streamlined banking system and social programs. In global terms, the last of these raised the income of large numbers of people who were erstwhile excluded from the benefits of economic development and turned them into members making up the huge, attractive Brazilian consumer market. Like other countries, India made aggressive use of both monetary and fiscal policy, with a total fiscal stimulus that increased the fiscal deficit above the planned level by almost 4 percentage points. This fiscal accommodation for the crises led to an increase in fiscal deficit from 2.7 percent in 2007-08 to 6.2 percent of GDP in 2008-09.
In India, in January 2009, the Prime Minister's Economic Advisory Council stated, "The incremental transfer payment of 5 percent of GDP to the household and corporate sector through subsidies and tax reduction is large by any definition. It may be argued that much of it antedated the financial crises, but the fact is that its disbursement overlapped the crises and would have the same effect had the transfers been conceived at a later date". India's relatively good performance on personal incomes was supported by endogenous and rural sources of growth through hikes in procurement prices, National Rural Employment Guarantee Schemes and farmers' debt relief. The Government launched three fiscal stimulus packages between December 2008 and February 2009. These stimulus packages came on top of an already announced expanded safety-net program for the rural poor, the farm loan waiver package and payout following the Sixth Pay Commission Report, all of which added to stimulating demand. The combined impact of these fiscal measures is about 3 percent of GDP(Rajya Sabha Secretariat , Government of India2009).
The prime minister's address to industry on November 3, 2008 "Our first priority was to protect the Indian financial system from possible loss of confidence or contagion effects. I am happy to say that the direct exposure of our banks to problem assets is minimal. Our banks are well regulated and also well capitalized. I think we have successfully conveyed to our people that our banking system, both in the public and the private sector, is safe, and the Government stands behind it and that no one should fear for the safety of bank deposits. We have also taken several measures to infuse liquidity into the system to ensure adequate flow of credit."
India put in place a system of sound financial regulations to ward against the crises. The RBI did not resort to continuous monetary policy easing as unlike Brazil India was facing inflationary processes. However, through the Reserve Bank's actions, the amount of primary liquidity potentially available to the financial system at the time was 7 percent of GDP. The RBI also took measures to address the issue of systemic risk, which included prudential capital requirements, exposure norms, liquidity and asset liability management, reporting requirements, corporate governance and disclosure norms, etc.
Along with this, RBI's attempt to prevent rupee appreciation helped in accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. RBI also, bought dollars so that reserves were favorable, but while adding to domestic money supply. This along with increases in global oil and commodity prices led to double digit inflation.. In August 2008, the annual WPI-based inflation was 12.8 percent. RBI responded to the pressure by tightening monetary policy. High interest rates that resulted from heavy borrowing to finance deficit by the government led to further slowing of growth. The real interest rates fell, due to inflation, but the nominal rates were high. As a result, GDP began to slow down even before September 2008. (Refer Table 13 ).
Inflation rates within limits in Brazil
The Brazilian economy began to improve in the second quarter of 2009. One of the most important factors was the perception that inflation, the eternal enemy during recessions, would continue to fall. The soundness of the institutions and the cautious monetary policy was consolidated by the revaluation of the Brazilian Real. The system thus began to accept the idea that the cost of living would remain within the 4.5% target, which in fact occurred, as the final numbers showed that the IPCA (Official Consumer Price Index) increased by 4.3%. Naturally, keeping inflation low meant that the government could safely pursue a policy of monetary easing and fiscal stimulus without worrying about inflationary outcomes (José Roberto Mendonça de Barros , 2010). Once Stabilization was not an issue, the government could focus on expansionary policies, most of which focused on both the fiscal and monetary side. Between October and December 2008, the following measures were introduced in Brazil: a reduction in some prudential requirements (i.e., compulsory deposits to be transferred to the Banco Central); providing 7 billion Real to Brazil Development Bank (BNDES) as well as an additional 5 billion in order to finance pre-shipment and other export operations; changes in a few rules to allow for the offer of extra Real 10.5 billion for the agricultural sector and a special program for providing operating capital to firms in the building and construction sector. A further increase in public expenditures was again authorized in 2009 together with an easing of credit conditions, specially for the less well-off and small and medium-sized enterprises. The Banco Central do Brasil also, began reducing the basic interest rate. The set of policies on monetary and fiscal fronts was almost together, the Ministério da Fazenda (Finance Ministry) having taken collective action in early 2009. Most measures had either a reduced time frame-a few months, in the case of tax waivers for boosting consumption, for instance-or were once and for all decisions, like the setting of extra credit lines at BNDES, Brazilian Development Bank (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social) or the payroll increases that helped to increase disposable incomes. A rough estimate has been put that the funds directly mobilized for the stimulus would still be only around 1.5 per cent of the 2008 GDP.
The macroeconomic regime implanted in Brazil during the second administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and largely maintained by his successor, is typical of those adopted in other developed countries. The anchor is provided by an inflation-targeting regime (with a target inflation rate somewhat greater than in most advanced countries, of 4.5 per cent a year, with a band around it of +/-2 per cent). The exchange rate is flexible-float. The float is often described as free, but given the extent of recent reserve accumulation it would not qualify as a true free float.
Fiscal policy was actually more ambitious and revenue generating under President Lula da Silva's regime, resulting for a time in a primary surplus (Fiscal deficit minus interest payment is primary deficit) of at least 4.25 per cent of GDP. Monetary policy had then been directed at achieving the inflation target given fiscal policy, which-given history-has implied maintaining high interest rates.
At the onset of the crisis the Central Bank of Brazil had quickly provided smaller banks with a strong liquidity cushion. This put them in a stronger position and they could adjust their portfolio without any banks failing. Commercial lines of credit in US dollars were simultaneously set up, using foreign reserves, in order to provide liquidity for exporters. (Valerie Cerra, et al.,2008) The Banco do Brasil played a key role in the operation. In fact, the main public banks (Banco do Brasil, Caixa Econômica Federal and Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social) expanded their loan portfolios dramatically. Finally, interest began to be reduced more systematically down by 500 points in a year, which obviously helped to turn credit around. The Treasury also reacted by speeding up revenue expenditure and it did so in two ways: (1) by again increasing the public sector payroll; and (2) by increasing social security spending and transfers to the private sector. As mentioned earlier this added to the growth of personal incomes. It was found, for example, that the total payroll of the public sector for 2009 was up by more than Real 17 billion, which represents nearly 40% of the estimated growth for total personal income in Brazil. Thanks to the higher salaries, civil servants and pensioners were granted loans that they spent on purchasing goods to the tune of nearly Real 22 billion. (José Roberto Mendonça de Barros , 2010).
On the fiscal front, taxes were lowered for a series of products, the lowering of the car tax being the most significant. In fact, this sector became a special case as its sales recovered dramatically. This was a good strategic decision, as it was aligned with control of inflation. Cars are given a high weight of in the Price Index (vehicles carry an 8% retail price weight in Brazil).
Fiscal stimulus measures taken by the governments of the two countries were made more feasible as the public debt of both nations at the time was at manageable levels. ( Table 14) were not required to handle the crises effects and the economies could nevertheless recover easily and quickly.
Major downfall was in exports, especially in India
From April to August 2009, exports declined by 31 percent in U.S. dollar terms, compared to a similar period in 2008. In August 2009 alone, they declined by 19.4 percent. Interest subvention on pre-shipment and post-shipment export credit was given. Export incentives in the form of duty drawback, or its conceptual equivalent, the DEPB (Duty Entitlement Passbook Scheme) were extended. However India's response to the crises did not include any buy Indian clauses. However, customs and countervailing duties were raised, a move made possible by the existing gap between applied and bound rates. Export restrictions were relaxed, but quantitative restrictions on exports and imports of several agricultural items were and are determined by what is happening to food price inflation. The high dependence on crude oil imports and the experience of 1990-91 caused India to err on the side of caution in accumulating foreign exchange reserves. The level of reserves was sub-optimal in the sense of being excessive with low yields, since they are invested in safe assets. The ratio of foreign exchange reserves to total external debt was 137.8 percent and the ratio of short-term debt to foreign exchange reserves was 15.2 percent. Unlike the balance of payments crises in 1990-91, all external debt indicators were sustainable and nowhere near crises levels and as we saw in Table 12 the foreign exchange position was comfortable (Bibek Debroy, Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.), 2010). In addition to growth in domestic consumer demand as mentioned earlier, Brazilian exports also, began to enjoy a positive impact from the strong recovery of the Chinese economy. In 2009 China became the largest trade partner of Brazil and was the destination for 13% of national exports from Brazil. At the same time, the share of US in exports from brazil fell to approximately 10% and moved to second place.
Industrial exports however, could not keep pace with the growth rate of commodities exports due to the low technological component in the exports of Brazil which are more inclined to be resources based. However, bio-technology and offshore oil were two of the four areas of currently greatest technological progress (along with IT and aeronautics/astronautics) that were part of Brazilian exports. Also, being a global trader, with diverse markets, Brazil is able to use the fact that there is always a type of client (like China) with expanding markets. Brazil pursues a commercial policy that is dynamic, always looking to open new markets and fighting against protectionism. A positive turnaround in the economy was thus, visible from the second quarter of 2009 itself. In fact, the recovery of Brazil was faster than India, in contrast to earlier historical patterns of high volatility in Brazil and stability in India.
Conclusion
Brazil and India were able to weather the crises without deleterious effects comparable to other worst hit countries across the world. This was due to the state of the macro-economic indicators and policies prevailing at the onset of the crises in large measure. Quick responses in monetary policy and fiscal measures were made to an extent. However, the important implication was that no deeper structural policies, like corporate tax cuts, company bail-outs or support to business, were made to handle the crises effects in Brazil. In case of India also, there was no institutional restructuring undertaken that could be ascribed to the crises. The crises did not contribute to any remarkable changes in financial regulation and supervision or result in creating new institutions such as so-called bad banks.
